The paper provides an analysis of efficiency in the care for the elderly sector in
Introduction
In the next decades the number of elderly people will increase sharply in most West European countries due to increased longevity and the large cohorts born in the years after WWII. This wave of the elderly puts pressure on public budgets, and pension reforms are heavily debated in most countries. The wave of the elderly will also increase the demand and need for health services and elderly care. Since the pressure on care for the elderly will come 10-15 years later than the pressure on pensions, the debate regarding the future organization and financing of elderly care has hardly started. However, efficiency is likely to be a key issue when the future organization and financing are to be discussed.
There are several contributions in the literature that calculates the efficiency potential in the care for the elderly sector, and in particular nursing homes. Among these are the Dutch analysis by Kooreman (1994) , the Swiss studies by Fillippini (2001) and Crivelli et al. (2002) , the Danish study by Hougaard et al. (2004) , and the Finnish study by Laine et al. (2005) . In the US literature the focus has been on efficiency differences between for-profit and not-forprofit organizations, e.g. Nyman and Bricker (1989) and Vitaliano and Toren (1994) .
The first contribution of this paper is to add an efficiency analysis of the care for the elderly sector in Norway to the international literature.
1 As in the other Scandinavian countries, care
for the elderly is a municipal responsibility, and the DEA analysis is carried out at the municipal level and includes both home based care and nursing homes. The analysis reveals substantial variation in efficiency across municipalities, and the national level efficiency potential is calculated to 10%. A possible objection to these interpretations is that it is hard to capture all aspects of output, and in particular service quality is hard to measure. For a subsample of the municipalities we have access to a novel data set on service quality, and there is no evidence that high calculated efficiency is associated with low quality.
Our second contribution is to provide an extensive analysis of variation in efficiency across municipalities. The international literature has emphasized the roles of ownership (public versus private) and objective (for-profit versus not-for-profit), but such factors are of little relevance in the Scandinavian context where care for the elderly is a municipal responsibility 1 Earlier Norwegian contributions include Edvardsen et al. (2000) and Kalseth (2003) .
and there are few private providers. We analyze efficiency as a municipal decision involving local democracy, and focus on the fiscal capacity of the municipality, the degree of user charge financing of the care for the elderly sector, as well as political institutions. The variation in efficiency is analyzed using Tobit regressions and bootstrap procedures developed by Simar and Wilson (2007) . The second stage analyses indicate that high fiscal capacity, a low degree of user charge financing, and a high degree of party fragmentation are associated with low efficiency. It is an interesting finding that user charge financing may reduce the pressure on public budgets in two ways, by replacing public funds and by reducing inefficiencies. The impact of user charge financing is robust to use of instruments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The principles of DEA analysis are discussed in Sect. 2, while Sect. 3 provides institutional background and specifies the production function.
The results are presented in Sect. 4 (DEA) and Sect. 5 (determinants of efficiency).
Concluding remarks are offered in Sect. 6.
Data envelopment analysis (DEA)
We analyze efficiency in the care for the elderly sector using data envelopment analysis (DEA). This nonparametric method is based on Farrel (1957) and extensions of his work by Charnes et al. (1978) . Within the DEA approach, the technical efficiency of a production unit is measured relative to a best practice reference frontier, which is calculated from the data.
Efficient units are located on the frontier, while inefficient units are located inside the frontier.
The DEA method easily handles multiple outputs and inputs and does not require information on neither inputs nor outputs prices, and is for these reasons widely applied to analyses of public services.
The principles of the DEA method are illustrated in Figure 1 , where a single output is produced by a single input. The four units of production are labeled A, B, C, and K. The location of the frontier depends on whether we assume constant returns to scale (CRS) or allow for variable returns to scale (VRS). With constant returns to scale the best practice reference frontier is represented by the line OO' that runs through the origin and observation B, the unit which has the highest output-input ratio. Unit B is located on the frontier and is fully efficient, whereas the other observations are inefficient since they are located below the frontier. Given the CRS frontier, unit K can reduce its input use from n to e without reducing output. The input oriented efficiency score (e I ) is calculated as hi/hK, and the efficiency score is lower the longer the distance from the observation to the frontier. The interpretation of the efficiency score is that if unit K was fully efficient, input could be reduced by (1-e I )100% without reducing production. Alternatively, an output oriented efficiency score (e O ) can be calculated as nK/nq. In this case the interpretation is that production can be increased by When variable returns to scale is allowed, the best practice reference frontier is given by the piecewise linear curve passing through the observations A, B, and C. Now units A, B, and C are characterized as technically efficient since they are located on the frontier, while unit K is still inefficient. 2 However, the input oriented efficiency score of unit K increases to hj/HK and the output oriented efficiency score to nK/nr. These differences between CRS and VRS hold in general. By assuming VRS, both the number of efficient units and the average efficiency score increases compared to CRS.
In the DEA analyses carried out in this paper we rely on VRS 3 technology for two reasons. 
Institutional context, users, and specification of the production function
In the Scandinavian countries, and also in Norway, care for the elderly is primarily a municipal responsibility. 4 The municipalities operate nursing homes and provide home based care, and do also determine the type of service and amount of care for individual users.
Private alternatives are few, and most private providers operate on contract for municipalities.
The municipalities are multi-purpose authorities, and the care for the elderly sector 'competes' with other sectors over the municipal budget. In addition to care for the elderly, 4 Assous (2001) and nursing homes are highly integrated, and it is difficult to split the resource use on the two activities. The appropriate level of analysis is therefore the care for the elderly sector in total,
i.e. both home based care and nursing homes. Our study is in this respect similar to the Danish study by Hougaard et al. (2004) , but differs from the vast majority of international studies that analyze nursing homes only.
The main challenge for efficiency analyses of care for the elderly is to measure output. The ideal indicators of output would capture improvements in health status and improved functioning in daily life, but they are obviously difficult to measure. The practical solution in the literature is to measure output based on the number of users, and to divide the users into groups with homogenous treatment within groups and heterogeneous treatment across groups (e.g. Nyman and Bricker 1989; Kooreman 1994; Vitaliano and Toren 1994; Hougaard et al. 2004 ).
In home based care the users are divided into three groups on the basis of the type of service they receive. The first group consists of users that receive practical help (34%), the second group of users that receive home nursing care (29%), and the third group of users that receive both practical help and home nursing care (37%). We expect the third group (both practical help and nursing) to have the greatest resource requirements.
Residents in nursing homes receive around the clock services, and there is currently no information on the type of services each individual patient receives. We have chosen to separate the residents on the basis of the length of stay, i.e. whether they are on permanent stay (86%) or short-term stay (14%). 6 Residents on short-term stay are younger and more vigorous than those on permanent stay, and may therefore require fewer resources than residents on long-term stay. On the other hand, residents on short-term stay often need treatment or rehabilitation before they can move back to their home. An advantage by the DEA procedure is that we do not need to determine a priori which group that has the greatest resource requirements. The weights of the different user groups are endogenously determined as part of the DEA analysis.
Our specification of the production function in the care for the elderly sector includes seven outputs. Five of these are the user groups discussed above (three in home based care and two in nursing homes). In addition we include the share of single rooms in nursing homes as an indicator of quality. We also include the share of mentally handicapped to take into account that this group has substantially resource requirements.
A possible objection to our specification of the output vector is that it does not explicitly take into account that the need for care increases with age. However, age is implicitly taken into account because the age composition varies systematically across the groups. Long-term residents in nursing homes are older than those on short-term stay. And within home based care the average age is significantly higher in the group of users that receives both practical help and nursing than in the two other groups. The remaining question is whether age is important after type of service is controlled for. We leave this issue for the second stage analysis where we investigate whether the variation in efficiency scores is related to the age composition of the users. The production of care for the elderly is labor intensive, and it would be desirable to measure input by man years in different categories. But since data for man years are considered unreliable, we have chosen to use current expenditures as measure of input. The use of expenditures as input implies that the DEA analysis strictly speaking provides a mix between technical efficiency (quantities of labor) and prices (cost of labor).
The inputs and outputs in the DEA analysis is summarized in Table 1 along with some descriptive statistics. Data are from 2003 and were available for 420 of the 434 municipalities.
The results of the DEA analysis
Descriptive statistics for the efficiency scores calculated from the DEA model are reported in Table 2 . Mean input oriented technical efficiency is 0.844 when all municipalities are given equal weight. This means that the average municipality could reduce expenditures by 15.6% without reducing measured output. If we rather rely on the output oriented efficiency scores, the average municipality could increase production by nearly 17.6% without increasing expenditures.
The mean efficiency score is line with earlier Norwegian studies. Edvardsen et al. (2000) ,
who (as us) analyze both home based care and institutions, calculate the mean efficiency potential to be 14%. Kalseth (2003) , analyzing nursing homes only, report mean efficiency scores in the range 0.75-0.84 depending on model specification. Moreover, the Danish study by Hougaard et al. (2004) report an improvement potential of 20%, while the Finnish study by Laine et al. (2005) report a mean inefficiency of 16%. Beyond the Scandinavian countries, the efficiency potential is calculated to 11% for nursing homes in Wisconsin (Nyman and Bricker 1989) , to 29% for nursing homes in the New York State (Vitaliano and Toren 1994) , to 6%
for Dutch nursing homes (Kooreman 1994) , and to 15% for Swiss nursing homes (Crivelli et al. 2002) . It is the weighted mean of the efficiency scores that reflects the national efficiency potential.
The weighted average of the input oriented efficiency score is 0.895, which yields an efficiency potential of 10.5%. The calculated efficiency potential reflects substantial variation in efficiency across municipalities. The efficiency score varies from 0.52 in the municipality with lowest efficiency, to 1 in the 72 municipalities that come out as fully efficient. There is also substantial variation among the middle half of the municipalities, nearly 20 percentage points. The distribution of the input oriented efficiency scores is illustrated in Figure 2 . With output oriented efficiency the national efficiency potential is calculated to 10.6%. 
Efficiency score
Input and output oriented efficiency scores yield strikingly similar results in Table 2, but this is not sufficient to conclude that the two measures are highly correlated. The two measures could be weakly correlated, but still have a similar distribution. In our case however, they are highly correlated. The rank correlation is above 0.99. In the rest of this section we rely on input oriented efficiency scores in order to simplify the presentation.
As discussed in Sect. 2, the calculated efficiency scores may be sensitive to measurement errors and outliers. We perform Jackknifing to investigate whether this is a problem in our case. Jackknifing means that we leave out each efficient municipality one at a time. In our case with 72 efficient municipalities, 72 additional DEA analyses are conducted. When one efficient unit is left out, the mean efficiency score of the remaining units will generally increase. 7 The efficiency scores are considered to be robust if the increase is small and if the ranking of the municipalities is similar to the original ranking. In our case the maximum increase in efficiency is 0.3 percentage points and the lowest rank correlation is 0.992, indicating that the results are robust to measurement errors and outliers. The grouping of municipalities is based on input oriented efficiency scores assuming VRS technology. Current expenditures per user are measured in Norwegian kroner (NOK) 1,000.
As a first step to characterize efficient and inefficient municipalities Table 3 focus on the aggregate of practical help and nursing, the fully efficient municipalities provide 17% more assistance than the sample average. And the municipalities with below median efficiency (the two lower groups) are on average 13% below the sample mean. When it comes to supervision quality, there is some tendency that higher efficiency scores are associated with lower nursing supervision quality, but the difference is small in relation to the 1-4 scale. For doctoral supervision the most efficient municipalities are on the sample mean, while the least efficient group has slightly lower quality than the rest. The Q's refer to the quartiles in the distribution of input oriented efficiency scores in the original sample of 420
municipalities. The quality of nursing and doctoral supervision is measured on a 1-4 scale. The last column reports Spearman's rank correlations between the efficiency scores and hours of assistance/ evaluation of supervision, p-values in parentheses.
The most right column in Table 4 reports statistical tests of the relationship between the efficiency score and hours of assistance per week/ evaluation of supervision. Most correlations are insignificant and indicate that there is no systematic relationship between the efficiency score and the indicators of service level and service quality. The only significant correlation points towards a positive relationship between the efficiency score and hours of practical help. Nursing supervision quality is the only indicator that is negatively correlated with the efficiency score, but the correlation is weak and far from significant. Table 4 provides little or no support for the hypothesis that the efficient municipalities come out as efficient simply because they provide less services and/or lower service quality. This understanding is in line with Nyman and Bricker (1989) who document that there among not-for profit nursing homes is a positive relationship between efficiency score and quality (measured by Medicaid certification code violations). Their interpretation is that managerial incompetence leads to both low efficiency score and low quality. Moreover, Kooreman (1994) find only weak evidence that a high efficiency score is associated with low quality (measured by procedures and restrictions on visiting hours).
It is our interpretation that the complementary analysis in

Explaining variations in efficiency
We now turn to the issue of how to explain the variation in efficiency documented in Sect. 4.
Why do some municipalities come out with low efficiency scores, while others are characterized as efficient? US contributions (e.g Nyman and Bricker 1989; Vitaliano and Toren 1994) have focused on the role of ownership on efficiency in nursing homes, and tend to find that for-profit private homes are more efficient than public and not-for profit private homes. On the other hand, the Swiss study by Crivelli et al. (2002) finds no significant effect of ownership and regulatory settings. In the Scandinavian context, where care for the elderly is a municipal responsibility and with only few private providers, ownership can not account for the variations in efficiency. The issue must be addressed as part of the municipal decision making, and following earlier Norwegian studies of efficiency in the local public sector we focus on the roles of fiscal capacity, user charge financing, and political institutions. In the background inefficiency is understood as a principal agent problem as originally formulated by Niskanen (1975) .
The fiscal capacity of the municipality is an important economic factor that may affect efficiency. Increased fiscal capacity increases the demand for services for the elderly, and the service producing agencies may be able to take advantage of the increased demand to enjoy more budgetary slack and thereby reduce efficiency. As indicator of fiscal capacity we use a "real" per capita revenue measure published annually by the Ministry of Local Government.
The starting point is the sum of block grants and tax revenues taken from the municipal accounts. Since high per capita revenue to some extent is compensation for unfavorable cost conditions, the revenues must be "deflated" in order to capture the real differences across municipalities. The cost index from the spending needs equalization system is used as where is the share of representatives from party p. The index takes the maximum value of 1 when a single party holds all the seats in the local council, while the minimum value of 1/P is attained when the seats are equally divided among the P parties. The index can be interpreted as the probability that two randomly drawn members of the council belong to the same party. Alternatively, we can say that it captures the number of parties in the local council and the distribution of seats among them. The value of the index is reduced (fragmentation increases) when the number of parties increases and when the seats are more equally divided among a given number of parties.
p SH
In Norway the socialist camp is dominated by the Labour party, while the non-socialist camp is more fragmented. As a consequence, there is a positive correlation between the HerfindahlHirschman index and the share of socialists in the local council. Since we cannot rule out that socialist influence has an impact on efficiency, one could argue that the share of socialists should be included in the analysis to get an unbiased estimate of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index. A more substantive argument is that earlier studies have found that a high share of socialists is associated with high administrative spending (Kalseth and Rattsø 1998) , low efficiency in nursing homes (Kalseth 2003) , and low educational efficiency (Borge and Naper 2006) . A possible interpretation of these findings is that it may be harder for socialists to impose a hard budget constraint on service providers because they are more concerned about service quality.
The standard approach in the literature is to analyze the determinants of efficiency using Tobit regressions. Tobit is supposed to be an appropriate method since the dependent variable, the calculated efficiency scores from the DEA analysis, is censored at 1. However, recent contributions (e.g. Xue and Harker 1999; Simar and Wilson 2007) have emphasized two possible problems by applying Tobit in this context. First, the efficiency scores are not independent observations since the calculation of the efficiency score for one municipality necessarily involves all other municipalities in the sample. As a consequence, the error term in the Tobit model will be serially correlated and standard inference is not valid. The second problem is that the efficiency scores may be biased in finite samples. Simar and Wilson (2007) have developed bootstrap procedures to deal with these problems. The bootstrap procedures are applied by Afonso and St. Aubyn (2006) and Latruffe et al. (2008) . In both studies the bootstrap results were similar to the results from standard methods. We have chosen to start out by presenting results from Tobit regressions. In addition we perform bootstrapping as a robustness check. Tobit estimates with t-values in parentheses. The dependent variable is input oriented efficiency scores assuming VRS technology. In model E the share of elderly 80 years and above is used as instrument for the degree of user charge financing.
In the regressions presented in Table 5 the dependent variable is the input oriented efficiency scores. 11 Model A is the baseline specification. In addition to the four variables discussed above, it controls for the two structural characteristics population size and settlement pattern.
The two economic variables come out as significant and with expected signs. A high level of revenue contributes to lower efficiency, while a high degree of user charge financing has the opposite effect. Among the political variables, only the Herfindahl-Hirscman index is significant. The interpretation of the positive coefficient is that a more fragmented local council leads to lower efficiency.
The findings that high fiscal capacity and a high degree of party fragmentation are associated with low efficiency is in line with earlier studies of efficiency in Norwegian municipalities, e.g. Kalseth (2003) analyzing nursing homes, Borge and Naper (2006) Population size seems to be an important background factor to explain the variation in efficiency, and larger municipalities have higher efficiency scores. However, the impact of population size does not reflect economies of scale since variable returns to scale is allowed for in the underlying DEA analysis. It rather reflects that the variation in efficiency scores across municipalities is related to population size, and more precisely that the variation is larger among small municipalities. The share of the population living in rural areas comes out as statistically insignificant, which indicates that the settlement pattern is of little importance.
The two insignificant variables, the share of the population living in rural areas and the share of socialists in the local council, are not included in the additional equations reported in Table   5 .
The definition of user groups in the DEA analysis is based on type of service, and does not take account of age. In model B we control for the age composition of the users by including the share of user 90 years and above (separate variables for home based care and nursing 11 Descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables are reported in Table A1 in the appendix.
homes). The negative coefficients for the two variables are consistent with the hypothesis that elderly users are more resource demanding, but the effects are far from being statistically significant. 12 The quantitative effects are also modest. A one standard deviation increase in the share of users 90 years and above is associated with a reduction in the efficiency score of 0.3 percentage points (nursing homes) and 0.5 percentage points (home based care). The lack of significance of the age composition of the users yields support to our specification of the production function. Moreover, the impacts of fiscal capacity, user charge financing, and party fragmentation are robust to the control for the age composition of the users.
The age composition of the population is important for the demand for welfare services like child care, education, and care for the elderly, see e.g. Borge and Rattsø (1995) . These services make up a large share of the total budget, and increases in the relevant age groups represent fiscal pressure that may promote efficiency. In model C we control for the share of the population eligible for child care (0-5 years of age), primary and lower secondary education (6-15 years of age), as well as the main target group for elderly care (the share of the population 80 years and above). The share of children 0-5 years of age is the only variable that comes out as significant, but the negative sign is inconsistent with the fiscal pressure hypothesis. Again, signs and significance of fiscal capacity, user charge financing, and party fragmentation are robust to the modification of the model.
In model D we report the results from a parsimonious specification including party fragmentation, municipal revenue, the degree of user charge financing, and population size.
We use the parsimonious specification in model D to illustrate the quantitative effects of the key variables. Efficiency will be reduced by nearly 1 percentage point if municipal revenue increases by 10 percentage points, whereas efficiency will increase by 1.7 percentage points if user charge financing increases by 1 percentage point. An increase in party fragmentation by one standard deviation is predicted to reduce the efficiency score by 1.7 percentage points.
Finally, an increase in the population size by 10,000 is predicted to increase the efficiency score by 2.3 percentage points.
12 One might suspect that multicollinearity is a problem here, but also the joint significance of the two variables is clearly rejected. The F statistic (with 2 and 405 degrees of freedom) is 0.36 and the corresponding p-value is 0.70.
It is an interesting result that a high degree of user charge financing is associated with high efficiency. It indicates that more user charge financing may reduce the pressure on public budgets in two ways, a direct effect of replacing public funds and an indirect effect through increased efficiency. However, it could be objected that the estimated effect is due to a mechanical relationship between efficiency and the degree of user charge financing. The point is that municipalities with high levels of expenditures tend both to be less efficient (see Table   3 ) and to have a low degree of user charge financing (through the definition of the variable).
This issue is addressed in model E in Table 5 where we instrument the degree of user charge financing. As instrument we use the share of the population 80 years and above. This is a valid instrument in the sense that it is highly correlated with the degree of user charge financing 13 and it satisfies the exclusion restriction (see model C). The degree of user charge financing comes out with a positive effect on efficiency also when it is instrumented. Contrary to the concern expressed above, the quantitative effect increases. And although the coefficient is less precisely estimated, it is still highly significant.
In Table 6 we report additional robustness tests using the parsimonious specification The first stage of the bootstrapping procedures is to estimate a DEA model as in Sect. 4 of this paper. The second stage is to estimate a truncated regression model with the efficiency scores from the first stage as dependent variable and the determinants of efficiency as explanatory 13 In the first stage regression the estimated coefficient is 0.553 with a t-value of 8.33.
14 In the following we provide a brief description of the bootstrapping procedures. The reader is referred to Simar and Wilson (2007) for a more thorough description.
variables. The truncated regression model has the same potential problems as the Tobit model, i.e. the efficiency scores are serially correlated and the estimates are biased in finite samples.
The single bootstrap is designed to tackle the serial correlation problem and to improve on inference. The estimates are those obtained in the second stage, but bootstrapping is applied to obtain an empirical distribution for the estimates. The bootstrapping is performed by conducting L drawings of residuals from a truncated normal distribution, and then reestimate the truncated regression model for each drawing.
The double bootstrap procedure is designed to tackle both the inference problem and the bias problem. After the two first stages described above, L 1 drawings of residuals from a truncated normal distribution is performed to estimate bias-corrected efficiency scores. These bias- We have performed single and double bootstrap using the algorithms provided by Simar and Wilson (2007) . These algorithms are based on a measure of technical inefficiency defined as the inverse of the output increasing efficiency score (Shephard's output distance function).
We use the same algorithms, and for comparison we first reestimate the Tobit model with this measure of technical inefficiency as dependent variable (model C in Table 6 ). As expected, the main consequence is that coefficients take on opposite signs compared to model B.
The results from the single and double bootstrap procedures are reported as respectively model D and model E. Regarding the number of bootstrapping replications, we follow Simar and Wilson (2007) and set L=L 2 =2,000 and L 1 =100. It turns out that the bootstrapping procedures yields similar results as Tobit in terms of sign and significance of the coefficients.
The only modification is that the Herfindahl-Hirschman index loses significance with the single bootstrap procedure. In terms of quantitative effects however, the double bootstrap estimates are substantially larger than the single bootstrap and Tobit estimates. 
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Concluding remarks
The purpose of the paper was to calculate the efficiency potential in the care for the elderly
sector in Norway and to analyze variation in efficiency across municipalities. In the first stage DEA analysis the national efficiency potential is calculated to 10%. The efficiency potential is robust to outliers, and a complementary analysis, covering a sub-sample of the municipalities, yields little support to the hypothesis that high efficiency simply reflects low quality. It should be noted that the calculated efficiency potential is based on VRS technology and do not take account of scale inefficiencies. Allowing for cooperation in services provision or consolidation of municipalities would increase the efficiency potential.
In a second stage analysis we performed Tobit regressions and recently developed bootstrap procedures in order to explain the variation in efficiency scores across municipalities. The qualitative effects are very robust across estimation methods, and the main findings are that high fiscal capacity, a low degree of user charge financing, and a fragmented local council are associated with low efficiency. The results indicate that user charges may reduce the pressure on public budgets in two ways, directly by replacing public funds and indirectly by increasing efficiency. The impact of user charges also is significant when the variable is instrumented. 
